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1The Number of Firms and
the Politics of Export Subsidy
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to present a framework to understand that the government’s implementation
of export subsidy is inﬂuenced by the political pressure from the home ﬁrms which can bear the costs
of forming and maintaining a lobby in order to overcome a free-rider problem associated with lobbying.
When the number of the foreign ﬁrms is large in comparison with that of the home ﬁrms, the home
ﬁrms can organize a lobby group more easily and lobby for higher export subsidy. The implementation
of politically optimal export subsidy can make the domestic social welfare far worse than when the free
trade is maintained by a multilateral agreement which prohibit export subsidies.
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21 Introduction
In a Cournot duopoly setting, where one domestic ﬁrm and one foreign ﬁrm compete in a third market,
Brander and Spencer(1985) show that a government export subsidy may increase its national welfare by
shifting suﬃcient rents from the foreign ﬁrm. This argument for proﬁt-shifting export subsidy, which
was diﬀerent from conventional wisdom, has generated a lot of subsequent work which have shown that
free trade may not maximize national welfare in a world with oligopolistic industries. However many
economists will not necessarily approve to implement such export subsidy and give a number of caution
about it1 .
From a viewpoint of political economy , in particular, there are two concerns in the caution; retaliation
and lobbying2 . The export subsidy aimed at shifting suﬃcient rents from foreign ﬁrms is believed to
increase national welfare at the expense of other countries. Hence a country which attempts to such policy
will provoke retaliation and cause tariﬀ war. The result of tariﬀ war will usually be a prisoners’ dilemma
where both countries are worse oﬀ than under free trade3 . The way to avoid getting trapped into such
a prisoners’ dilemma is to establish agreements between exporting countries to prohibit export subsidies.
Nowadays, Article 3.1(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
which came into force in January 1995, prohibits all members of the World Trade Organization, except
the least developed countries, from subsidizing exports of industrial products. The threat of a tariﬀ war
can provide a political economic rationale for this WTO rule from the aspect of international relations4 .
Also, the government’s enforcement of export subsidy is likely to be inﬂuenced by interest groups’
lobbying. In the real world, a government does not necessarily aim at maximizing social welfare but at
winning elections. The government concerned with winning elections can not ignore political pressure
from interest groups because the government needs their political supports. Hence, it may happen that
the government implements too much export subsidy or chooses unsuitable industries as targets of export
subsidy. Considering such points, Krugman(1987) argues that maintaining a free trade is the best policy
which the government can take actually because the government is unable to escape from their political
pressure. When the political pressure on implementation of export subsidy is taken into consideration,
3it can also be justiﬁed to restrain the action of the government by means of multilateral agreements
that prohibit export subsidy in the light of internal politics. However there have been few studies that
analyze the inﬂuence of lobbying on the government export subsidy, while there have been many studies
of political economy of international trade policy5 .
Moore and Suranovic(1993), following the approach used by Findlay and Wellisz (1982), incorporate
the home ﬁrm’s lobbying for higher export subsidy into the basic model of Brander and Spencer(1985) and
analyze what inﬂuence such lobbying has on social welfare. It is shown that enforcement of an export
subsidy may decrease the social welfare of its own country and so the country can be worse oﬀ than
under free trade when the ﬁrm’s lobbying is socially wasteful enough. However, it does not investigate
in detail the conditions where the home ﬁrm’s lobbying for higher export subsidy can make the domestic
social welfare worse than under free trade. Also, it does not analyze in detail the export subsidy level
determined politically and home ﬁrms’ lobbying.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze in detail the inﬂuence of the political activity by the home
ﬁrms in the same industry on the government export subsidy, and is to deepen our understanding about
it. In this paper, following the approach used by Grossman and Helpman (1994), we will focus on the
situation where home ﬁrms in the same industry jointly oﬀer the political contribution to an incumbent
government in order to induce it to provide more export subsidy. We also examine the export subsidy
level which the government politically chooses, and the joint political donation which is paid to the
government by home ﬁrms. Moreover, we analyze the eﬀect of the politically determined export subsidy
on the domestic social welfare and consider when the implementation of politically determined export
subsidy can make the domestic social welfare far worse than under free trade.
Furthermore, Moore and Suranovic(1993) do not considers the formation of a lobby because they
analyze the situation where a home ﬁrm lobby for a higher export subsidy and thus a free-rider problem
does not come about. Just as Moore and Suranovic(1993), in the political economy of trade policy
literature, many studies has so far been done under the assumption that interest groups lobbying for
trade policy already exist. However, anyone who has the common interest over trade policy cannot
4necessarily organize a lobby. It is because that a free-rider problem is associated with lobbying for trade
policy since the lobbying has public-good characteristic: while those who do not bear the costs of lobbying
for trade policy could enjoy the return from it, people who bear the costs can not prevent them from
doing such acts. In order to lobby eﬀectively, it is necessary to solve the free-rider problem6 .
In this paper, we investigate the eﬀect of the number of foreign ﬁrms on the home ﬁrms’ lobby
formation. In recent years, some works model how a lobby is endogenously formed in the political process
to solve the free-rider problem. There are two approaches about endogenous formation of a lobby in the
political economy of trade policy literature. The ﬁrst approach analyze whether the free rider problem
is solved by the use of a trigger strategy in an inﬁnitely repeated game setting (e.g. Pecorino(1998),
Damania and Fredriksson(2000), and Magee(2002)). The second approach introduces the organizational
costs of lobby for solving the free-rider problem into the model (e.g. Mitra(1999)). This paper’s approach
is the same as the latter; we assume that the home ﬁrms must pay the costs to form and maintain a lobby
in order to overcome the free-rider problem and oﬀer their joint political donation to the government for
higher export subsidy.
This paper is organized as follows. We develop the model in Section 2. Section 2.1 sets out the
assumptions of the model used throughout this paper and Section 2.2 derives the subgame perfect equi-
librium outcome. In this Section, we take up two points: (i)how the home ﬁrms which can form the
organized lobby jointly oﬀer political contribution to the government for higher export subsidy; and
(ii)how the government selects export subsidy in order to maximize her chance of re-election as a result
of the political donation from the home ﬁrms.
In Section 3, we consider the eﬀects of the change of the number of home ﬁrms and that of foreign ﬁrms
on the politically determined export subsidy level. When the home ﬁrms can organize a lobby and give
political contribution to the incumbent government, the government selects the politically optimal export
subsidy which is higher than the welfare-maximizing export subsidy for its own country. An increase in
the number of home ﬁrms makes the politically optimal export subsidy lower. When the number of
foreign ﬁrms increase, the government selects higher export subsidy. Moreover, we examine the eﬀects of
5the change of the number of home ﬁrms and that of foreign ﬁrms on the political contribution level which
the home ﬁrms give to the government. An increase in the number of home ﬁrms makes the amount of
their joint campaign contribution smaller. When the number of foreign ﬁrms becomes larger, the amount
of their joint campaign contribution becomes higher. We note that the eﬀect of the number of home and
foreign ﬁrms on their joint campaign contribution corresponds to that on the politically optimal export
subsidy level.
In Section 4, we investigate the inﬂuence of the change of the number of foreign ﬁrms on the home
ﬁrms’ lobby formation. When the home ﬁrms must bear the cost of organizing a lobby in order to solve
the free-rider problem and give their political donation to the government for higher export subsidy, an
increase in the number of foreign ﬁrms makes it easier for the home ﬁrms to organize a lobby. We note
that whether or not the home ﬁrms can form and maintain a lobby depends on the ratio of the number
of home ﬁrms to that of foreign ﬁrms.
In Section 5, we ﬁnally examine the eﬀect of the implementation of the politically optimal export
subsidy on the domestic social welfare. We investigate when the implementation of politically optimal
export subsidy can make the domestic social welfare far worse than under the free trade which is main-
tained by multilateral agreements which prohibit export subsidies. We ﬁnd that under either of the
following conditions the government’s implementation of politically optimal export subsidy is likely to
make the domestic social welfare far worse than when the free trade is maintained: (i)the number of
home ﬁrms is much smaller than that of foreign ﬁrms; (ii)the number of home ﬁrms is almost the same
as that of foreign ﬁrms; or (iii)the large portion of organizational costs of lobby is wasted socially. Under
these conditions, from a political economy viewpoint, it is desirable to impose restrictions on the govern-




Let us consider a Cournot competition in a third-market. There are n ﬁrms in the home country and
m ﬁrms in the foreign country, producing a homogeneous good and exporting to the third-market. We
assume that there is no consumption in the producing countries, and there is neither entry nor exit,
no transportation costs and no trade barriers. Each ﬁrm in each country competes for quantities with
Cournot conjecture in the third country. We assume that these ﬁrms have identical technology and a
constant marginal cost, c, is required to produce one unit of the commodity. The domestic government
gives the home ﬁrms an export subsidy, s > 0, per unit exported. The foreign government does not give





j), where a > 0 and b > 0 are parameters. P stands for the product price in the third country. qi
and q¤
j are the output of the representative home and foreign ﬁrm, respectively. The home and foreign
ﬁrms are assumed to maximize proﬁts,
¼i = (P ¡ c + s)qi ; (1)
¼¤
j = (P ¡ c)q¤
j : (2)
Let us turn to the political market for export subsidy. In this paper, following the approach used
by Grossman and Helpman (1994), we will focus on the situation where the risk-neutral home ﬁrms
in the same industry can coordinate campaign contribution and make a collective contribution to the
government in the hope that it will increase export subsidies to them7 . The joint campaign contribution
from the home ﬁrms is denoted by CJ. The foreign ﬁrm and home ﬁrms is assumed not to lobby in the
home country and foreign country, respectively8 .
Note that a free-rider problem can be associated with the home ﬁrms’ political contribution activity.
Therefore, the home ﬁrms are required to form and maintain a lobby. We assume that the home ﬁrms
must organize a lobby and bear some costs of organizing it. The organizational costs consist of two kinds:
variable costs (e.g. a monitoring cost and a cost of building a communications network among members)
7and ﬁxed costs (e.g. a cost of forming an organization, establishing links with politicians and a cost of
hiring professional lobbyists)9 .
The costs of forming and maintaining it are assumed to be
F = ¸(n ¡ 1)2 + f ; (3)
where ¸ is an eﬃciency parameter. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of Eq.(3) represents the variable
costs of forming and maintaining it and the second term its ﬁxed costs. This function has two desirable
properties10 . First, it equals f when n equals 1, so that the ﬁrm bears only the ﬁxed costs. Second, it
rises rapidly as n increases, which reﬂects the widely accepted belief that the diﬃculty of forming and
maintaining the lobby raises rapidly as the number of ﬁrms increases. Since there are two or more ﬁrms
in the home county, each home ﬁrm is assumed to bear the“n” th part of the organizational costs. Each
home ﬁrm has an incentive to enjoy a free ride on the other home ﬁrms’ political contribution activity,
when
CJ+f
n¡1 ¸ ∆¼ is satisﬁed11 . In the rest of the paper, this condition holds as long as n-home ﬁrms
inﬂuence the government export subsidy through lobbying activity.
In the setting here, the incumbent government is to seek to maximize its probability of re-election.
The government will care about the average voters’ wellbeing and the political donation received from the
home ﬁrms because winning an election depends on public endorsement and funds for campaign. Note,
however, that the assumption that a government needs political contribution for campaign is implicitly
based upon the assumption that most voters are uninformed12 . The government’s objective function is
taken to be a weighted sum of political contributions and aggregate social welfare,13
G = CJ + °W(s) : (4)








CJ is the joint campaign contribution from the home ﬁrms and ° is the weight that the government
places on aggregate social welfare relative to the campaign contribution.
8The model is constructed as a four-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the home ﬁrms decide whether
to contribute the money to ﬁnance forming and maintaining a lobby. In the second stage, if the home
ﬁrms can organize the lobby, they oﬀer the incumbent government a contingent campaign contribution
schedule, CJ(t). The contribution schedule maps an export subsidy level, s, in the government’s one-
dimensional choice set, S, into a campaign contribution level; (CJ : S ∪ R+). The contribution schedule
is assumed to be diﬀerentiable. In the third stage, the government selects an export subsidy level, taking
the contribution schedule as given. At the same time, the incumbent government receives from the home
ﬁrms the amount of contribution associated with the export subsidy. In the last stage, the home ﬁrms
and the foreign ﬁrms choose the level of their output simultaneously and export the good to a third
country, taking the export subsidy as given.
2.2 A model of endogenous lobby and trade policy formation
In this section, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium by means of backward induction. In the last
stage, the home and foreign ﬁrms decide their output and export the good to the third country, taking
the export subsidy as given. Assuming that the home and foreign ﬁrms produce in positive quantities,
the ﬁrst order conditions for a Cournot competition are
d¼i
dqi





= a ¡ bQ ¡ c ¡ bq¤
j = 0:
These ﬁrst order conditions can be solved to yield the output level,
qi =
a ¡ c + (m + 1)s
(m + n + 1)b
; q¤
j =
a ¡ c ¡ ns
(m + n + 1)b
: (6)
Since the home ﬁrms and the foreign ﬁrms are, respectively, symmetric , we will represent qi as q and q¤
j
as q¤. The proﬁt of the home ﬁrms and the foreign ﬁrms are
¼i = bq2; ¼¤
j = bq¤2 : (7)
Thus, the aggregate social welfare for home country is given by
W(s) = n
·
(a ¡ c + (m + 1)s)(a ¡ c ¡ ns)
(m + n + 1)2b
¸
: (8)
9Let us consider the trade policy formation process14 . We can regard the home ﬁrms as a principal,
and the incumbent government as an agent in the policy-making process15 . We will consider what
contribution schedule the home ﬁrms should collectively oﬀer to the government, using Figure.1.
A curve G0G0 depicts the combinations of the export subsidy level, s, which the government selects
(on the horizontal axis) and the joint campaign contribution, CJ, from the home ﬁrms (on the vertical
axis), which satisfy °W(so) ´ CJ+°W(s). so is the optimal export subsidy for the government in absence
of any campaign contribution from them. Note that so is the social-welfare-maximizing export subsidy
because it derives from maximization of °W(s). sa means the export subsidy level which induces the
foreign ﬁrms to export nothing to the third country. The curve G0G0 is, in other words, the incumbent
government’s indiﬀerence curve representing the highest utility level which the government can attain in
absence of any campaign contribution. When the government selects an export subsidy diﬀerent from
so, the government needs to attain contributions to maintain the same utility level as °W(so). Since
the government’s objective function is a concave function of s for a given value of CJ, the government’s
indiﬀerence curve, G0G0, has the shape shown in Figure 1. So, the upper indiﬀerence curve for the
government represents the higher government’s utility level.
A curve J0J0 depicts the combinations of the export subsidy level selected by the government and





curve J0J0 is, in other words, the indiﬀerence curve for the home ﬁrms, representing the highest joint
proﬁt which the home ﬁrms can gain when they do not oﬀer any campaign contribution. Since the joint
proﬁt for the home ﬁrms is an increasing function of s, the higher export subsidy the government selects,
the more joint campaign contribution the home ﬁrms must oﬀer to the government in order to maintain
the same aggregate proﬁt level as
Pn
i=1 ¼i(so). The indiﬀerence curve for the home ﬁrms, J0J0, has the
shape in Figure 1. So, the lower indiﬀerence curve for the home ﬁrms represents the higher joint proﬁt
level.
The home ﬁrms set their joint contribution schedule, taking account of the incumbent government’s
indiﬀerence curve. The point A : (sp¤;C¤
J) yields the highest joint proﬁt to the home ﬁrms among those
10that leave the government the same utility level as the government can attain with no contributing from
the home ﬁrms. The home ﬁrms must collectively contribute a tiny bit more C¤
J to induce the government
to choose sp¤. However, when the home ﬁrms contribute the same amount of C¤
J, the government will feel
no reluctance to choose sp¤ because she can derive exactly the same utility as she would attain without
any campaign contribution from the home ﬁrms. It is most desirable for the home ﬁrms to collectively
contribute the same amount of C¤
J. That is, they exactly compensate the government for the welfare loss
which arises from changing so into sp¤. Therefore the home ﬁrms jointly oﬀer the contribution schedule
CJ(s) which is tangent to G0G0 at the point A. We can see that if the home ﬁrms jointly oﬀer this
contribution schedule in the ﬁrst stage, the incumbent government will choose sp¤ at the point A in the
second stage. Notice that in the neighborhood of the equilibrium, the derivative of joint proﬁt function
for the home ﬁrms with respect to the export subsidy is equal to that of their joint campaign contribution
schedule with respect to the export subsidy16 .
In the third stage, the incumbent government chooses the export subsidy level to maximize G, taking






















= 0 : (9)
At the political equilibrium, the incumbent government acts as if it maximized a weighted sum of the
home ﬁrms’ joint proﬁts and aggregate social welfare.
Solving Eq.(9) for s yields the politically optimal export subsidy,
sp =
(2(m + 1) + °(m + 1 ¡ n))(a ¡ c)
2(m + 1)(°n ¡ m ¡ 1)
: (10)
When the second order condition is satisﬁed, the denominator is positive. In Figure 1, this is represented
as sp¤. At this time, in the fourth stage of the game the home ﬁrms will give the incumbent government
11the following amount of political contribution;
CJ = °[W(so) ¡ W(sp)] : (11)
The home ﬁrms jointly contribute an amount that is proportional to the excess burden which the equi-
librium export subsidy impose on the society. This is represented as C¤
J in Figure 1.
If the home ﬁrms can not organize the lobby and oﬀer any campaign contribution, the government
selects the following export subsidy;
so =
(m + 1 ¡ n)(a ¡ c)
2n(m + 1)
: (12)
so is also the social-welfare-maximizing tariﬀ, which the benevolent government would select.






We note that the highest possible equilibrium export subsidy is sa. Since further increases in export
subsidy at sa do not lead to any greater gains for the home ﬁrms, they do not have any incentive











s=sa, the home ﬁrms jointly oﬀer the contribution schedule which is tangent to
the government’s utility function at sa in the ﬁrst stage and the incumbent government selects sa in the
second stage.
We now turn to the ﬁrst stage of the game, where the home ﬁrms must decide whether to contribute
the money to ﬁnance forming and maintaining the lobby in order to solve the free-rider problem. From
the assumption that each home ﬁrm is symmetric and bears the “n”th part of the organizational costs,
the home ﬁrms can organize the lobby if the following condition is satisﬁed;
V = n[¼(sp) ¡ ¼(so)] ¡ CJ ¡ F
= nb[q(sp)2 ¡ q(so)2] ¡ °[W(so) ¡ W(sp)] ¡ ¸(n ¡ 1)2 ¡ f ¸ 0 : (14)
If the incremental beneﬁt from their joint political donation is larger than the sum of the political donation
12and the organizational cost, the home ﬁrms have an incentive to form and maintain the lobby for political
activity.
3 Equilibrium Export Subsidy
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium export subsidy level. We will investigate the eﬀect of a change
in the number of home ﬁrms or that of foreign ﬁrms on the equilibrium export subsidy level.
Using Eq.(12) and Eq.(13), the diﬀerence between sp and so is
sp ¡ so =
(n(m + 1) + m(m + 2))(a ¡ c)
2n(m + 1)(°n ¡ m ¡ 1)
> 0 :
sp is larger than so as a result of lobbying by the home ﬁrms. In Figure 2, we demonstrate the export
subsidy level of sp, so and sa for varying the number of home ﬁrms on the horizontal axis (2 · n · 10),
when, for example, a = 200, b = 1, c = 5, m = 10 and ° = 12. From the ﬁgure, we can conﬁrm that the
government does not necessarily choose the welfare-maximizing export subsidy for its own country as a
result of the political pressure from the home ﬁrms, which can organize the lobby.





2(m + 1)[(°n ¡ m ¡ 1)]2[(°n ¡ m ¡ 1) + 2(m + 1) + °(m + 1 ¡ n)] < 0 ;
when n · m + 117 . At this time, as seen in Figure 2, sp becomes smaller as n increases. From Eq.(9),
the eﬀect of a change in the variable on the equilibrium export subsidy level consists of two parts;








s=sp; and the eﬀect of a change in the variable on the derivative of the

















s=sp smaller when the number of foreign ﬁrms is given constant. Thus
the government must select smaller export subsidy to satisfy Eq.(9). It is for this reason that an increase
in the number of the home ﬁrms makes the terms of trade loss by the export subsidy larger than the
incremental proﬁt-shifting gain by the export subsidy because an increase in export by the more home
ﬁrms lower the price of the good in the third country.





2(m + 1)(°n ¡ m ¡ 1)2[°(°n ¡ m ¡ 1) + 2(m + 1) + °(m + 1 ¡ n)] > 0 ;











s=sp larger when the number of
home ﬁrms is given constant. Thus the government must choose larger export subsidy to satisfy Eq.(9).
The reason is that an increase in the number of the foreign ﬁrms makes the proﬁt-shifting gain larger
than the terms of trade loss because an export subsidy can shift suﬃcient rents from the more foreign
ﬁrms.
The following proposition summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the home ﬁrms lobby for higher export subsidy, the government chooses
the export subsidy which is higher than the welfare-maximizing one. When the number of home ﬁrms
increases, the government selects lower export subsidy at an equilibrium. When the number of foreign
ﬁrms increases, the government selects higher export subsidy at an equilibrium.
4 Political Contribution
In this section, we will consider the eﬀect of a change in the number of home ﬁrms or that of foreign
ﬁrms on the amount of the joint political contribution which the home ﬁrms give to the government.
The amount of the joint political contribution from the home ﬁrms is represented as Eq.(11). From
Eq.(11), we can consider that the amount of the joint political contribution becomes larger when the
gap between between sp and so becomes larger. This is because the welfare loss arising from the im-
plementation of the politically optimal export subsidy depends on the gap between between sp and so.




°m(m + 2)(a ¡ c)
2(m + 1)(°n ¡ m ¡ 1)
< 0 :
When the number of the home ﬁrms increases, the diﬀerence between sp and so becomes smaller (See




2n(a ¡ c)[(°n ¡ m ¡ 1)[m(m + 1) + (m + 2)] + (m + 1)[n(m + 1) + m(m + 2)]]
[2n(m + 1)(°n ¡ m ¡ 1)]2 > 0 ;
14When the number of the foreign ﬁrms increases, the diﬀerence between sp and so becomes larger.
Proposition 2 When the number of home ﬁrms increases, the amount of the joint political contri-
bution from the home ﬁrms becomes smaller. In contrast, when the number of foreign ﬁrms increases, it
becomes larger.
It is worth noting that the eﬀect of the number of home and foreign ﬁrms on their joint campaign
contribution corresponds to that on the politically optimal export subsidy level (See Proposition 1). Due
to the complexity of the solution referring to equilibrium joint political donation from the home ﬁrms,
we will make use of numerical analysis. In Figure 3, we show the equilibrium level of CJ for varying the
number of the home ﬁrms on the horizontal axis (2 · n · 10), under the same numerical value as in
Figure 2. From Figure 3, we can conﬁrm that an increase in n makes the amount of the joint political
contribution from home ﬁrms smaller when m is set constant. As is seen in Figure 3, an increase in m
makes the amount of the joint political contribution from home ﬁrms larger when n is set constant.
5 The Number of Firms and Lobby Formation
Let us examine the eﬀect of a change in the number of foreign ﬁrms on the formation of an organized
lobby by the home ﬁrms. As has been noted above, a free-rider problem is associated with the home
ﬁrms’ political contribution activity and thus it is necessary for them to organize a lobby in order to
overcome it and carry out political activity. Hence, the home ﬁrms must bear the costs of forming and
maintaining the lobby. An increase in the number of the home ﬁrms makes the home ﬁrms’ formation and
maintaining of their lobby more diﬃcult and gets the costs of organizing lobby to be larger. Therefore,
if the number of the home ﬁrms is very large, the home ﬁrms can not organize the lobby. Then, does an
increase in the number of foreign ﬁrms make the home ﬁrms’ lobby formation easier? In this section, we
take up this question.
If Eq.(14) becomes positive, the home ﬁrms have an incentive to form and maintain the lobby for
political activity. Since the solution referring to n[¼(sp)¡¼(so)]¡CJ at the equilibrium is complicated, we
shall make use of numerical analysis. In Figure 4, we depict the equilibrium level of n[¼(sp)¡¼(so)]¡CJ
15and ¸(n ¡ 1)2 ¡ f for varying the number of the home ﬁrms on the horizontal axis (2 · n · 10), when,
for example, a = 200, b = 1, c = 5, m = 10, ° = 12, ¸ = 10 and f = 4500. Under these numerical values,
as seen in Figure 4, the home ﬁrms the number of which is 2 can bear the organizational costs, and can
form and maintain the lobby. It can be understood that the larger the organizational costs becomes, the
smaller the number of home ﬁrms which can organize the lobby.
When the number of foreign ﬁrms increases from 10 to 15 in this numerical analysis, as seen in Figure
4, the curve represented as n[¼(sp)¡¼(so)]¡CJ shifts upward and the number of home ﬁrms which are
able to organize the lobby becomes larger. This reason can be considered as follows. Diﬀerentiating q(sp)















@m is positive: an increase in the number of foreign ﬁrms leads to the larger incremental
beneﬁt from their joint political donation. This is because an increase in the number of the foreign ﬁrms
makes the proﬁt-shifting gain larger than the terms of trade loss. On the other hand, an increase in m
gets CJ larger (See Proposition 2). However, an increase in m makes n[¼(sp) ¡ ¼(so)] more larger than










@m is positive. Therefore, when the number of the foreign ﬁrms is
large in comparison with that of the home ﬁrms, the home ﬁrms can organize a lobby group more easily.
Proposition 3 In a Cournot oligopoly, whether or not the home ﬁrms can form and maintain a
lobby depends on the ratio of the number of home ﬁrms to that of foreign ﬁrms.
We note that whether the home ﬁrms can form and maintain a lobby depends not only on the number
of home ﬁrms but also on that of foreign ﬁrms.
6 Prohibition of Export Subsidy and Domestic Welfare
In this section, we examine the eﬀect of the implementation of the politically optimal export subsidy on
the domestic social welfare under the assumption that the home ﬁrms organize a lobby and are engaged in
political contribution activity for more export subsidies19 . To ﬁgure out when its implementation makes
16the domestic social welfare far worse than under free trade, we will take up two regimes: (i)the home ﬁrms
use political donation to induce the government to fork out more subsidy to them; and (ii) the home
ﬁrms are unable to lobby because the government must maintain free trade to respect a multilateral
agreement which prohibit export subsidies. Is it desirable to impose restrictions on the government’s
implementation of export subsidy by a multilateral agreement which prohibit export subsidies?
When the government gives the industry an export subsidy, s, the incremental social welfare of its
own country is given by
W(s) ¡ W(0) =
ns
(m + n + 1)2[(m + 1 ¡ n)(a ¡ c) ¡ n(m + 1)s] : (15)
Whether or not the implementation of an export subsidy, s, improves the domestic social welfare depends
on the level of s20 . The sign of ∆W T 0 is rewritten as
s S
(m + 1 ¡ n)(a ¡ c)
(m + 1)n
: (16)
Substituting Eq.(10) into s in Eq.(16), we obtain
° T
2(m + 1)2
n(m + 1 ¡ n)
: (17)
If the size of political weight, °, is smaller than the right hand side of Eq.(17), the domestic country is
worse oﬀ at the equilibrium in export subsidy than under free trade.





2(m + 1 ¡ 2n)(m + 1)2




2n(m + 1)(m + 1 ¡ 2n)
[n(m + 1 ¡ n)]2 > 0 ;
where RH is the right hand side of Eq.(17). When the number of the foreign ﬁrms is large in comparison
with that of the home ﬁrms, ° is likely to be smaller than the right hand side of Eq.(17) due to a decrease
in the number of home ﬁrms or an increase in that of foreign ﬁrms. We can consider the reasons as
follows. When the number of home ﬁrms which can organize a lobby is relatively very small, the home
ﬁrms give much political donation to the government and so the government fork out high export subsidy
17to them (See Proposition 1 and Proposition 2). This export subsidy is so high that the opportunity cost
of the government revenue, which is assumed to be equal to one, can exceeds the proﬁt-shifting gain net
of the terms of trade loss. Hence, W(0) will be larger than W(sp). In Figure 5 we demonstrate the
welfare level of the domestic country for varying the number of the home ﬁrms under the same numerical
value as in Figure 2. In Figure 5, we can conﬁrm that W(0) is larger than W(sp) under the condition;
Compared with the number of foreign ﬁrms (m = 10), the number of home ﬁrms which can organize the
lobby is very small (i.e. n = 2).
Furthermore, in Figure 5 we ﬁnd out that W(0) is larger than W(sp) under the condition; The number
of home ﬁrms which can organize the lobby is almost the same as that of the foreign ﬁrms (i.e. n = 9;10)21
. We can consider the reasons as follows. When the number of home ﬁrms which can form a lobby is
almost the same as that of the foreign ﬁrms, the implementation of politically optimal export subsidy
leads to the larger terms of trade loss. As a result, the proﬁt-shifting gain net of the terms of trade loss
is smaller than the opportunity cost of the government revenue and W(0) will be larger than W(sp).
Recall that the part of the costs of forming and maintaining the lobby can be socially wasteful. As
Krueger(1974) and Bhagwati(1982) point out, rent seeking activity, which only inﬂuences the government
decision, is unproductive and thus this activity can deteriorate the social welfare. Lobbying by the home
ﬁrms can indirectly aﬀect the domestic social welfare in this way22 . If a part of the organizational costs,
say 100, is socially wasted, W(sp) shifts down to W(sp)(with welfare loss ¡ 1) in the ﬁgure. As is seen
in the Figure 5, W(0) can be larger than W(sp) even if the number of home ﬁrms is 5;6;7 or 8. Moreover,
when the socially wasted organizational costs are 200, W(sp) shifts down to W(sp)(with welfare loss¡2).
We can see in Figure 5 that W(0) is always larger than W(sp).
The following proposition summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 4 The conditions where the government’s implementation of politically optimal export
subsidy is likely to make the domestic social welfare worse oﬀ than under the free trade are as follows:
(i)the number of home ﬁrms is much smaller than that of foreign ﬁrms; (ii)the number of home ﬁrms
is almost the same as that of foreign ﬁrms; or (iii)the large portion of organizational costs of lobby is
18socially wasted.
Considering that the conditions in this proposition are realistic, we can say, from a viewpoint of
political economy, it is desirable to impose restrictions on the government’s implementation of export
subsidy by a multilateral agreement which prohibit export subsidies, like the Article 3.1(a) of the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
7 Concluding Remarks
In the real world, a government does not necessarily aim at maximizing social welfare but at maximizing
political support in order to win elections. Thus, the home ﬁrms which can organize a lobby use political
pressure to induce the government to fork out more export subsidy to them. What we have analyzed,
in this paper, is the inﬂuence of lobbying by the home ﬁrms in the same industry on the government’s
enforcement of export subsidy. Particularly, our focus has been on the political contribution activity by
the home ﬁrms and their lobby formation. Our ﬁndings are the followings.
When the home ﬁrms which can organize a lobby oﬀer their campaign contribution to the incum-
bent government, the government selects the politically optimal export subsidy which is higher than
the welfare-maximizing export subsidy for its own country. When the number of home (foreign) ﬁrms
increases, the government selects lower (higher) export subsidy. Furthermore, the eﬀect of the number
of home and foreign ﬁrms on their joint campaign contribution corresponds to that on the politically
optimal export subsidy level. When the number of home (foreign) ﬁrms becomes larger, the amount of
their joint campaign contribution smaller (larger).
We have also investigated the inﬂuence of the change in the number of foreign ﬁrms on the home ﬁrm’s
lobby formation. When the home ﬁrms must bear the cost of forming an organized lobby in order to
overcome the free-rider problem associated with lobbying and give political donation to the government
for higher export subsidy, an increase in the number of foreign ﬁrms makes it easier for them to form
an organized lobby. We have noted that whether or not the home ﬁrms can form and maintain a lobby
depends on the ratio of the number of home ﬁrms to that of foreign ﬁrms.
19Moreover, we have examined the eﬀect of the implementation of the politically optimal export subsidy
on the domestic social welfare. The conditions under which the government’s implementation of politically
optimal export subsidy is likely to make the domestic social welfare worse oﬀ than under the free trade
are as follows: (i)the number of home ﬁrms is much smaller than that of foreign ﬁrms; (ii)the number of
home ﬁrms is almost the same as the number of foreign ﬁrms; or (iii)the large portion of organizational
costs of lobby is wasteful socially. Since these conditions are realistic, this conclusion can provide a
political economic rationale for multilateral agreement which prohibit export subsidies, like the Article
3.1(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
There is room for further examination in this paper. First, we have analyzed the situation where the
government implements too much export subsidy as a result of political pressure from the domestic ﬁrms.
In the real world, the home ﬁrms’ lobbying will induce the government to choose unsuitable industries as
targets of export subsidy. This point should be investigated as a future agenda. Second, we have used the
exogenously given organizational cost to form and maintain a lobby which can overcome the free-rider
problem associated with political activity. We may be able to examine endogenous mechanism to solve
the free rider problem using an inﬁnitely repeated game setting.
20Notes
1 If the model setting about market structure and the type of ﬁrm’s competition is changed, the
positive subsidy may not increase social welfare. See Eaton and Grossman(1986) and Grossman(1986).
2 See Grossman(1986) and Krugman(1987).
3 See Brander and Spencer(1985) and Collie(1993). In the real world, governments repeatedly have
a relationship with each other. If the game between the governments is inﬁnitely repeated, free trade
can be sustainable as a perfect Nash equilibrium. For discussion of the sustainability of free trade, see
Collie(1993).
4 Collie(2000), which focuses on opportunity costs of government revenue which are posed by im-
plementation of an export subsidy, analyzes an economic rationale for a multilateral agreement which
prohibits export subsidies.
5 Those are called ”the endogenous protection theory“. Hillman(1989), Rodrik(1995) and Help-
man(1997) are comprehensive surveys of the endogenous protection theory.
6 Olson(1965) claims that there is a strong relationship between the size of a group with common
interests and its ability of lobbying: an increase in the number of members with common interests makes
it more diﬃcult for them to overcome the free-rider problem associated with lobbying.
7 The eligible voter in home country are assumed to be unable to make political contributions. Be-
cause the costs of export subsidy is so widely dispersed that it does not induce them to engage themselves
in political activity. By contrast, the home ﬁrms are eager to lobby politicians for implementation of
higher export subsidy because the beneﬁts of export subsidy is so concentrated on them.
8 Hillman and Ursprung(1988) and Grossman and Helpman(1995) deals with this topic.
9 See Mitra(1999) p.1120.
10 See Werden and Baumann(1986) pp.332-333.
11 For detailed arguments for the free-rider problem, see Appendix A.
12 For detailed arguments for an informed voter, see Baron(1994), Grossman and Helpman(1996).
13 See Grossman and Helpman(1994) for the government’s objective function.




2(m + 1)[a ¡ c + (m + 1)s]
(m + n + 1)2b
> 0 :
Hence, the home ﬁrms have an incentive to lobby for higher export subsidy.
15 In modeling of the policy-making mechanism, we basically follow Grossman and Helpman(1994),
who drew on a menu auction model developed by Bernheim and Whinston(1986). See also Dixit, Gross-
man and Helpman(1997).
16 See Proposition 1 in Grossman and Helpman(1994) p.839.










19 When the organizational cost for lobbying is very low, the home ﬁrms can organize a lobby even
if the number of companies are nine or ten in Figure 4.
20 The implementation of a export subsidy leads to the larger third country’s social welfare and the
smaller foreign country’s one.
21 Under this condition, ° is smaller than the right hand side of Eq.(17).
22 This point is also suggested by Moore and Suranovic(1993).
22Appendix
Here, we analyze the suﬃcient condition of the free-rider problem associated with lobbying. It is assumed
that the home ﬁrms must contribute money, the amount of C
p
J, in order to induce the government to
implement the export subsidy, sp, which is higher than the welfare-maximizing export subsidy, so, and
that the home ﬁrms must bear the ﬁxed costs, f, to lobby for higher export subsidy. There are n home
ﬁrms, which are symmetric. Each home ﬁrm which joins in cooperative lobbying bears the ”h“th part
of the organizational costs. h represents the number of the home ﬁrms which cooperate in lobbying:
h = n ¡ d, where d stand for the number of the home ﬁrms which defect from the cooperative lobbying.
When the home ﬁrms can not lobby, the government chooses the welfare-maximizing export subsidy, so.
Each home ﬁrm’s proﬁt is denoted as follows: V c




n under the cooperative lobby;
V d
j = ¼(tp) under its defection from the cooperative lobbying; V b




n¡d when other home
ﬁrms defect from the cooperative lobbying; and V n
j = ¼(to) when none of the home ﬁrms cooperates in
lobbying.
It is obvious that V d





n¡d > ¼(tp)¡¼(to), V n











n¡1 > ¼(tp) ¡ ¼(to). Therefore, when
CJ+f
n¡1 ¸ ∆¼ is satisﬁed, the free-rider
problem associated with lobbying comes about.
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